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This famous case is generally regarded as incorrectly decided.
Certainly it cannot be sustained logically on the grounds set
forth in the opinion. There is, upon a careful analysis, no
quasi-contractual obligation involved, and to discuss the case
from that point of view merely leads to confusion.
The action was in assumpsit for work and labor, and the
"declaration contained the common counts and among them a
count in quantum meruit for the labor." At the trial the plain-
tiff proved the performance of the labor. The defendant claimed
that the work was done pursuant to a special contract. By
this contract, which was bilateral, the plaintiff promised to work
for one year and the defendant promised to pay him $12o. The
plaintiff, having entered the defendant's service in March, volun-
tarily, without cause and without the consent of the defendant,
left such service sometime in December. The court instructed
the jury "that if they Were satisfied from the evidence that the
labor was performed, under a contract to labor a year, for
the sum of $120, and if they were satisfied that the plaintiff
labored only the time specified in the declaration, and then left
the defendant's service, against his consent and without any
good cause, yet the plaintiff was entitled to recover, under his
quantum meruit count, as much as the labor he performed was.
reasonably worth; and under this direction the jury gave a
verdict for the plaintiff for the sum of $95." To this charge the
defendant excepted. The charge was sustained, the supreme
court finding that, as no damage for the breach of the contract
by plaintiff was proved or any deduction asked, none could be
made in this case and that the defendant might still maintain an
action for such breach.
It is submitted that the court was wrong in sustaining the
above charge, and that substantial justice would be worked out
by adhering to the well settled rules of contract. As the defend-
ant contracted to pay $120, the breach by plaintiff of his promise
should play no part; the case should not turn on the fact of
non-performance of his contract by him. He is not now being
sued. The sole point to consider is, whether the defendant
has broken his promise. He has not paid the $12o and is liable
16 N. H. 481.
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therefore unless he has some defence. Whether he committed
a breach, depends upon whether his promise is absolute or con-
ditional. As far as the language is concerned there is no
condition, and we must therefore look to the doctrine of condi-
tions implied by law to see whether any rule covers the case.
In so doing we find that the plaintiff's performance takes time,
while that of the defendant is merely to pay money. Hence
the implied condition that the work must be performed before
the money is payable.2  But, unless the situation calls for the
application of this condition implied in law,-this rule of court,--
the promise of defendant is absolute and he can be called upon
to pay immediately without regard to what plaintiff has or
has not done. The condition, however, being a creation of the
court and introduced for the purpose of working justice, will
not be applied unless the plaintiff-s breach is of importance and
goes to the root of the contract, that is, unless the breach goes
to the essence and cannot be paid for by money damages-a
question of fact for the court. By applying this doctrine, then,
we find that perfect justice can be worked out in the above case.
It is only necessary to understand these rules and apply them
correctly. The question of whether the plaintiff is wilfully at
fault or not plays no part. The civil action is not to punish3
him but to make good the damage done to the other party. It
is by no means uncommon for a lawyer to advise his irate client
that although there is a clear breach of contract by the other
party, yet, as the client can prove no damage, he cannot recover,
a principle that frequently surprises the lay inquirer.
If the breach goes to the essence, is of such importance that
the defendant does not obtain sufficient benefit to make it just
to require him to keep his -own promise, the condition will be
implied in his favor and he will have a complete defense with
an action for damages caused by the plaintiff's breach. On the
other hand, if the damage is slight, does not go to the essence,
then he must perform, and has his counter action for the dam-
ages he has suffered. As modem practice admits a counterclaim
in such cases, the balance either way would be determined in
'Ashley on Contract, 202.
'In Byrd v. Boyd, 4 McCord (S. C.) 246, the court seems to have
overlooked the fact that they were engaged upon a civil case in which
"punishment" is not involved. Judge Johnson in giving the opinion of
the Court said: "I should feel no hesitation in enforcing the rule rigidly,
not only as a punishment but, etc."
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the one action and perfect justice be obtained under the express
contract itself. Britton v. Turner does no more than this and
yet it lays down a false rule for the measure of recovery and
accomplishes the unfortunate result that it encourages the breach
of a contract, does violence to well settled rules, and leads to
general confusion. Thus the opinion says:
"It has been held, upon contracts of this kind for labor
to be performed at a specified price, that the party who
voluntarily fails to fulfill the contract by performing the
whole labor contracted for, is not entitled to recover any-
thing for the labor actually performed, however much
he may have done toward the performance."
This result is sound and just, if the plaintiff's breach goes to the
essence. If it does not, he is entitled to recover on the con-
tract, and the defendant may counterclaim such damage as he
has suffered by plaintiff's non-performance. The court further
says:
"A party who contracts to perform certain specified
labor, and who breaks his contract in the first instance
without any attempt to perform it, can only be made liable
to pay the damages which the other party has sustained
by reason of such nonperformance, which in many
instances may be trifling; whereas a party who in good
faith has entered upon the performance of his contract
and nearly completed it,. and then abandoned the further
performance-although the other party has had the full
benefit of all that has been done, and has perhaps sus-
tained no actual damage-is in fact subjected to a loss
of all that has been performed, in the nature of damages
for the non-fulfillment of the remainder, upon the tech-
nical rule that the contract must be fully performed in
order to a recovery of any part of the compensation.
By the operation of this rule, then, the party who
attempts performance may be placed in a much worse
situation than he who wholly disregards his contract, and
the other may receive much more by the breach of the con-
tract, than the injury which he has sustained by such
breach, and more than he could be entitled to were he
seeking to recover damages by an action."
The results enumerated above do not at all follow. In the
first place the court says that by the "technical rule" the con-
tract must be fully performed in order to recover. But there
is no such rule. Such a result follows only a breach going to
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the essence, i. e., a breach so important that the other party
will not get the reasonable and fair benefit from the contract
which he was entitled to expect, and money damages will not
compensate him for the breach. The trial court should decide
this fact, and if it determines that the breach does go to the
essence, justice requires that there should be no recovery. But
if not, then a full recovery may be had and the defendant is
left to his suit for damages. Secondly, the court suggests that
the person who begins the work may be in a much worse situa-
tion than if he wholly disregarded his contract and did not begin
at all. But this again does not follow. The party suing for the
breach must prove the actual loss which he has suffered, and can
recover no more. If the defendant has already performed some
part, and the plaintiff has benefit therefrom, then his damage
is reduced pro tanto. Take the present case as an illustration.
The defendant could recover only the damage he has actually
suffered. If $95 worth of work has been received by him to
his benefit, then his damage must be that much less. Hence the
defendant does gain by what he has done, as the recovery against
him will be proportionately diminished. He is entitled to $120,
if his breach does not go to the essence. Against this the
defendant can counterclaim his damages which may or may not
be estimated by the jury at $25.
Writers commenting on this case4 criticise it solely on the
ground that the plaintiff has voluntarily committed the breach.
This seems to the writer a lame ground upon which to proceed.
It should make no difference in plaintiff's case whether he has
voluntarily or unavoidably committed the breach. He is suing
upon the defendant's promise, and the only defence is to show
that the courts will imply a condition precedent to the promise
sued upon, and hence there is no breach. But as this is entirely
a creature of the courts, not found in the contract, and invented
by them simply to work justice, they are entirely masters of
the situation and, having borrowed the idea from courts of
equity, can mete out exact justice and prevent unjust enrich-
ment. Where there is an express condition there can be no
recovery, be the unjust enrichment great or small. In other
words, the courts, in that event, refuse to go beyond the expressed
intent of the parties. In the case under examination the court
recognizes this and says:
'Woodward, Law of Quasi-Contract, p. 270, § 17o.
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"It is easy, if parties so choose, to provide by an express
agreement that nothing shall be earned, if the laborer
leaves his employer without having performed the whole
service contemplated, and then there can be no pretense
for a recovery if he voluntarily deserts the service before
the expiration of the time."
Of course this is sound, because the parties having the matter
fully in mind, expressly agree to a certain result. If the contract
voluntarily entered into by the parties provides for a situation
which may work injustice, it should be enforced nevertheless.5
The application of the well developed rules of condition
implied in law would work out exact justice in any given case,
without resort to such expedients as are adopted in this celebrated
decision. This is so whether one believes that conditions implied
in law are true conditions, based on the intent of the parties,
or merely rules of court gradually developed. At any rate,
whatever view one may take on that point, the rules and their
applications are well settled, and work out to a nicety the
equities of each case. The recovery should rest solely upon the
strength or weakness of the defendant's case.
In the case under discussion the plaintiff is allowed to recover
for the market value of his services and the principle is recog-
nized that the defendant might offset his damages." The
defendant's promise was to pay $i2o. Suppose, now, the market
value of labor had suddenly risen and the services actually
rendered worth $i5o, with damages perhaps of $20. Then,
according to this decision, the defendant would be obliged to
pay $x3o or $io more than he promised, although he was not
at fault in any way and the plaintiff was the one who broke the
contract.
The rules regarding quasi-contract are often invoked when
perhaps a true contract may be found. Thus, take the case
Champlin v. Rowley.7 About fifty tons of hay were delivered
under a contract before navigation dosed, when the further
'But see Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648, and Chism v. Shipper, 5i
N. J. L. i, where the courts deliberately disregarded the express provisions
in the contract.
'The Court says the recovery should not exceed the amount prom-
ised. That is recognizing the contract in order to escape this very
difficulty. Either the contract should be enforced or set aside. Here
they propose to recognize its existence in so far as it suits their purpose,
and then to ignore it.
1 3 Wend. 258.
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delivery was interrupted. The defendant sold or used the quan-
tity which he received under the contract. No recovery was
allowed by the plaintiff who had sued for the price of the hay
delivered. The case does not disclose whether the defendant
voluntarily used the hay after he knew that the plaintiff would
break his contract. If he did, such conduct might have amounted
to a waiver. But if no waiver can be found, then there would
seem to be a true promise to pay the market value of the hay
thus used. His action in using the hay after he knew that the
contract would not be carried out, would seem to indicate a
promise on the part of a reasonable man to pay the market value.
Of course this theory would justify the one who supplied the
hay, pursuant to the original contract, in refusing to enter into
the new contract implied in fact. He could demand the hay
back again because the assent of both parties is necessary.
Suppose a somewhat similar state of facts. A agrees to deliver
a certain number of brick at a private wharf at Poughkeepsie.
He fails to deliver all called for by the contract and the breach
goes to the essence. There could be no recovery for the bricks
delivered unless there is a waiver by defendant of the implied
condition precedent to his promise. If he has worked the brick
into his building as the delivery proceeded, there is no conduct
on his part from which a true promise can be inferred and there
should be no recovery in quasi-contract for unjust enrichment,
because the breach goes to the essence. If it does not, then the
full contract price should be recovered as promised by the
defendant, the implied conditions precedent to his promise not
being applicable as the breach is not material, and he is put to
his cross action for his damages. But suppose the brick are
left on the pier as delivered and, while they are there the delivery
ceases, so that B knows that A has broken his contract and sup-
pose further that such breach goes to the essence. B is then
not liable on his original promise. But if, after such recognized
breach, he voluntarily takes the bricks, he would seem to promise
to pay the reasonable price therefor, and there is a true con-
tract implied in fact. Here also A must directly, or by reasonable
intendment, acquiesce in the new contract.
Another class of cases raises a different situation. Suppose
a plaintiff in a given case has himself a defense, as for instance
sickness. Such defense should play no part in his affirmative
action. If his breach goes to the essence he can recover nothing,
and justice requires this. If not, then the defendant should
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keep his promise and pay the amount he agreed. Of course,
in that event, the result may be a slight enrichment by the
plaintiff, because he has a defense to any action which the
defendant may bring for damages. But as the law considers
that the parties must necessarily have taken the possibility of
sickness into their calculations, it would perhaps seem just that
the defendant should suffer this slight loss, particularly as he is
protected in case the breach is material.
It may be, however, that exact justice would be worked out by
permitting the defendant to offset his damages, and limit the
defense of sickness to a case where he is directly attacked.8
CLARENCE D. ASHLEY.
NEW YORK UNIVMZSITY.
Professor Woodward, Quasi-Contract, § 165, says: "If the premise
be true that conditions implied in law do not rest upon the actual
intent of the parties as inferred from the express terms of the con-
tract, there is no basis whatever for the claim that a contractor assumes
the risk of a failure to perform such conditions. And it is believed that
the premise ought to be true. That is to say, the courts ought to
recognize the futility of attempting to ascertain the unexpressed intention
of the parties-to say nothing of the probability that they had no inten-
tion whatever in the matter-and treat the condition as a fiction invented
in the interest of fair dealing. But the prevailing judicial dogma, it
is feared, is that conditions implied in law are genuine conditions, resting
upon the actual intent of the parties, as ascertained by an examination
of the entire contract, and unless this view is abandoned, any distinction
between express and implied conditions, as to their effect upon quasi-
contractual rights, is impossible."
Professor Woodward evidently believes that these conditions are
not based on the intent of the parties, as indeed such a clear thinking
man as he shows himself to be, must conclude. But he gives way to the
language of the courts as found in various opinions, and feels that the
matter is thus settled. It is as though the courts should describe a
cow in great detail, and say, "This is a horse." Doubtless they may
believe it to be a horse, but because their ignorance leads them into this
error does not make it any the less a mistake. The cow remains such
and is not turned into a horse, although the court may call it a horse
f6r years. Thus, in conditions implied in law, the judges talk about
the intention of the parties and then proceed to decide the case upon
principles of their own. Probably they do this in good faith but, for
all that, the fact remains the same; no intention is to be found. If
the intention were shown in the contract then the condition would be
express, and it would necessarily be enforced whether the breach went
to the essence or not. If the parties have once expressed an intention,
it is absolutely immaterial whether it is of any importance or not.
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This is recognized in Britton v. Turner when it is said that "it is easy
to provide by an express agreement that nothing shall be earned if
the laborer leaves his employer without having performed the whole
service contemplated." One of the just criticisms of Nolan v. Whitney,
88 N. Y. 646, is that the court disregards an express condition and
applies the rules of conditions implied in law. It is not disputed that
this doctrine of implied conditions first arose in Kingston v. Preston
(cited in Jones v. Barkley, Doug. 684, 689). In delivering the opinion
Lord Mansfield said that "in the case before the court it would be the
greatest injustice if the plaintiff should prevail." But if we are to
rely on the intent of the parties gathered from the contract, it can
make no difference whether justice results or not. The parties have
so agreed and that ends it. Sergeant Williams in his celebrated notes
to Pordage v. Cole, Williams' Saunders 319, in his rule 3 says: "Where
a covenant goes only to a part of the consideration on both sides, and
a breach of such covenant may be paid for in damages, it is an inde-
pendent covenant, and an action may be maintained without averring
performance in the declaration." In other words, where the breach
does not go to the essence, recovery may be had. If, however, the
intention of the parties is found, it can make no difference whether the
breach goes to the essence or not.
The first writer who scientifically handled the subject of conditions
implied in law was Langdell (Contract, § io5). He says: "Every con-
dition in a covenant or promise must be founded upon the intention
of the convenantor or promisor and generally this intention must be an
actual one, i. e., it must be proved to exist in each case. Conditions of
the class just referred to, however, are frequently founded upon an
intention which the law imputes to the covenantor or promisor without
any evidence of its actual existence in the particular case." But if the
law imputes the intention, of which there is no evidence, is not the law
laying down the rule of its own motion? How can we say that there is
intention when there is no evidence of it? Langdell then goes on
(Contract § io6) to explain how he thinks this can be done. Although
the animal has all the attributes of a cow, nevertheless it is a horse.
The explanation is very Langdellesque. Holmes (The Common Law,
334 et seq.) also speaks of the intention of the parties in these cases,
but proceeds to demonstrate the absurdity of the position. The present
writer said on this subject (Ashley on Contracts, 19I, N.) : "As shown
above (p. i89) Lord Mansfield founded these conditions upon equitable
considerations. Langdell (Contract, § io5) bases them upon the intent
of the parties, as does Holmes (Common Law, 334-335). Keener in
1893 (Quasi-Contract, 225) seems to have been the first to publish the
evidently sound view that these rules do not depend upon any supposed
intent of the parties, but upon the demands of justice. Professor Cos-
tigan (7 Columbia L. Rev. 152, n.) states that he borrowed this doctrine
from Professor Williston's lectures. The author took it from Keener."
In correspondence Williston says: "The credit, such as it is, for the
suggestion referred to here doubtless belongs to Mr. Ames, though he
never worked out the subject very elaborately. I imagine that he got
his suggestions from the civil law. At the time I was a student, Pro-
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fessor Keener had not worked very far away from Professor Langdell's
theory, and when I began to teach I started on the foundation I got
from Keener. Both of us, I suspect, worked farther and farther away
from Langdell in our views of the matter as we continued to teach."
Harriman (Contract, § 315) criticises Keener's views on this point. But
he begins by referrihg to Langdell's classification and adds: "Whatever
may have been the former importance of this distinction, it seems to be
of no practical consequence at the present day." He then proceeds to
complicate a sufficiently difficult subject by the employment of unusual
terms. His argument seems unconvincing. In Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29
Pa. St. 465, the court in speaking of the distinction between true
contracts and those implied in law says: "All true contracts grow out
of the intentions of the parties to transactions, and are dictated only
by their mutual and accordant wills. When this intention is expressed,
we call the contract an express one. When it is not expressed, it may
be inferred, implied or presumed from circumstances, as really existing,
and then the contract, thus ascertained, is called an implied one . ..
It is quite apparent therefore, that radically different relations are classi-
fied under the same term, and this must often give rise to indistinctness
of thought. And this was not at all necessary; for we have another
well authorized technical term exactly adapted to the office of making
the true distinction. The latter class are merely constructive contracts,
while the former are truly implied ones. . . . We have therefore,
in law, three classes of relations called contracts. i. Constructive
contracts, which are fictions of law adapted to enforce legal duties by
actions of contract where no proper contract exists, express or
implied." . . .
Although the historical development of "contracts implied in law"
and "conditions implied in law" is very different, yet if one uses
the above language with reference to conditions it is equally pertinent.
True conditions may well be called express, as they always have been,
while these rules or creatures of the courts, these "conditions implied
in law" might equally well be called "constructive conditions" or
perhaps, if this does not sufficiently bring out the difference, they may
be described as "rules of court" to indicate that they are not based on
the intent of the parties.
